This paper studies the impact of centralizing deployment on teachers' effort and students achievement by exploring the reforms of rural education system in China.
Introduction
Two problems plague the public school system in many developing countries: inadequate/inequitable teacher deployment and weak teacher incentive. It is often argued that the first problem can be tackled by centralizing personnel deployment; 1 and the second by instituting performance pay contract. Yet little is known on the interactions of these two policies, namely how deployment centralization affects teachers' incentive, and how they jointly determine educational outcomes. This paper explores the question in the context of rural education centralization reforms in China. We study the impacts of centralization of personnel authority on teachers' effort and affect students' academic performance. We also look for evidence on possible channels by exploring into wage structure and teacher allocation.
Practitioners and researchers have noted that the devolution of personnel deployment is critical to teacher incentive and school quality (e.g. Gaynor, 1998; Winkler and Gershberg, 2003 ). Yet few rigorous studies have been done in this area. In theory, centralizing deployment could affect teacher incentives in opposite directions. On one hand, centralized deployment may induce more effort by increasing job security and hence teachers' satisfaction, and improve the effectiveness of teaching by providing more professional support. On the other hand, personnel intervention from less informative upper-level government may deviate from local needs or even distort local teachers' reward structure. In reality, personnel centralization/decentralization is usually associated with other changes in the education system. The attempts to empirically evaluate the impacts of personnel centralization or decentralization often encounter identification problems. How centralized deployment affects teachers behaviors remains an unanswered empirical question.
The recent wave of centralization reform in China's rural education system has offered an unusual opportunity to study this question. In 1990s, rural primary and junior high schools (schools in the compulsory education system) were mainly financed and managed by xiang-level government. 2 This decentralized system is no longer sustainable in the 1 Teacher deployment remains the responsibility of the national or regional government even in many countries where decentralization reforms have long been adopted and school finance has been devolved to community level, e.g. Kremer et al. (2003) on Kenya. 2 The government bureaucracy largely consists of five ladders, i.e., from top to bottom, the national late 1990s when major sources of finance -rural education fees were lifted by the national government. Therefore, the national government launched "county-based" rural education reforms in 2001. The first move is to shift regular teachers' payroll onto county government budget. While the payroll shift was completed soon, the personnel authority has also been slowly transferred along the same line.
It is documented that regular teachers' wages have been improved (Ge 2003). However, case studies suggest that deployment centralization may harm school quality through several channels (e.g. Lu 2004; Ge 2001; Zhang 2004; Bao 2007). First, proponents of centralization argue that it facilitates equitable allocation of educational resources particularly qualified teachers. Yet moving to a better location/school is part of rewards for good teachers. 3 Deploying good teachers to remote areas without proper compensation (which is often prohibited or limited by the rigid wage structure in public school system) is likely to harm their incentives directly. The second and more common channel is through the implementation of performance pay. As teaching is a team production, a teacher's performance is also affected by his/her colleagues. To make the evaluation largely comparable among schools, local educational officials need to be capable of deploying teachers. Centralization of personnel control either deprives or limits this power and hence hinders the effective implementation of incentive pay. 4 Besides the impact on incumbent teachers, the change may also lead to selection of teachers of certain characteristics into/out of the teaching profession.
To assess the impacts of deployment centralization, we draw upon two sources of data. In identifying the role of deployment centralization on teacher effort, we exploit differences across xiangs in the timing of deployment power shift and make as the comparison group contract teachers who are not affected by deployment centralization. Although regular teachers' payroll had been shifted to county government in most places within two years after the launch of the reform, the transfer of deployment power was much slower as it depends upon political negotiations between xiang and county government.
In our sample xiangs, less than one half had centralized teacher deployment by 2003. 5 For notational convenience, we call those xiangs centralization xiangs and others comparison xiangs throughout the paper. The variations in timing allow us to use the difference-indifference (DID) method to estimate how the change in the measured effort of regular teachers from 2000 to 2004 in centralization xiangs differs from that in comparison xi-
angs.
Furthermore, to eliminate the effects of region-specific time-varying shocks, we use contract teachers as an additional comparison group and construct a difference-in-differencein-difference (DDD) model. As deployment centralization only applies to regular teachers, we compare the change in the measured effort of regular teachers relative to contract teacher in centralization xiangs to that in comparison xiangs. Estimates of the DDD model are consistent with those of the DID model. The increase in weekly teaching and grading time of regular teachers versus contract teachers in centralization xiangs is about 3 hours lower than that in comparison xiangs.
Next we estimate the impact of deployment centralization on students' academic performance using the difference-in-difference (DID) approach. We find that, in centralization xiangs, boys' test score improvement is 0.28 standard deviation lower than that in comparisonxiangs. Girls' test score improvement exhibits the same trend but the estimates are not statistically significant.
Why centralizing teacher deployment could be undermining? We first look for evidence by examining the allocation of teachers. There is no evidence on more equitable allocation in centralization xiangs. Some results even suggest the opposite. The equity-oriented 5 According to the GSSG in year 2007, xiangs that have completed the transfer is nearly doubled in
2007.
allocation is not likely to be the factor driving down teachers' effort.
We further explore the regular teachers' wage structure. We find that, the wage level increased more after the reforms in centralization xiangs than in comparison xiangs;
however, wages became less responsive to measures of merits such as education diploma, working hours but more responsive to seniority and job tenure. The finding suggests that the pay in centralization xiangs became less merit-based. Not a direct proof as it is, the result supports the hypothesis that personnel interventions from upper-level government hinders the implementation of performance pay. Survey of teachers and principals' opinion on the incentive scheme is also corroborative of this hypothesis.
Taken together, the results suggest the division of personnel power in the school system could have significant impacts on the effectiveness of implementing incentive pay and educational outcomes. Although previous studies suggest that incentive pay schemes could be a solution to the problem of low teacher effort in many developing countries, the implementation of these schemes may well require certain institutional commitment.
The pre-requisite institutional settings likely affect the incentives of the implementers and hence the de facto implementation. Future research in this direction is merited.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 introduces background information on rural education system and reforms in
China. We devote much space to description of contract teachers and regular teachers because it is important to our empirical strategy and no overview exists in the previous literature. Section 4 constructs an analytical framework. Section 5 describes the data and empirical strategy. In section 6 we show results on teachers' effort and students' test scores. In section 7, we discuss and test two alternative explanations. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
There is a large literature on the costs and benefits of decentralization versus centralization of public services. The main argument in support of decentralization is that the policy is more responsive to local needs as decision-making is brought closer to local cit- In the case of education, empirical evidence has been accumulated on the impacts of decentralization as the practice has been increasingly adopted throughout the world. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2006). However, only a few studies concern about the institutional environment of implementing performance pay. For example, Hanushek (2002, 2003) points out that the reason that public schools do not implement effective performance pay is lack of competition pressure instead of ignorance of its importance.
By comparing public, private and charter schools, Podgursky (2006) shows that, under decentralized systems, schools under competition pressure are more likely to adopt performance pay. In many developing countries, school choices are limited because of political or economic constraints reasons. Thus the division of power may be more likely to affect the constraints or incentives for the implementers. However, it has been rarely studied in the development settings. The evidence in this paper contribute to this strand of the literature.
Background

The Evolution of Rural Education System
The rural primary and secondary school system in China is separate from the urban one. Since the strict implementation of household registration (hukou) system in late 1950s, people have been tied to places where they were issued hukou card (usually their or their parents' birthplace). Rural-to-urban migration is tightly controlled. The hukou is linked to employment opportunities and access to local public services such as education and health care. School choices between xiangs are typically either limited by poor public transportation or restricted by national or local policies. 6 Choices within xiangs may be allowed in some places. However, the distance among schools often limits choices. The supply of private schools is scarce, especially in economically disadvantaged regions. 7
The segregation and various urban-biased polices have created enormous disparity in education. Rural public schools typically suffer from lack of funding and qualified teachers. The disparity had been entrenched after the Compulsory Education Law passed in 6 The national bureau of education holds a negative attitude towards school choices. In various documents and speeches, high-level education officials continuously labeled school choice as "illegal" and blamed it for bidding up school fees and entrenching inequality in education opportunities. 7 Private schools at the mandatory education level are discouraged by the national policy. In poor areas, parents usually can not afford to send kids to private schools.
1986. 8 The law specified a decentralized compulsory education system where local governments take most administrative responsibilities. It is also stipulated that school finance be provided by each level of government (namely, the national government, provincial government, county government and xiang government in rural areas) by proportion and by category. However, division of responsibilities was never clearly specified, especially for rural schools. Most of financial burdens eventually fell upon xiang government. From 1995 -1999, among all the fiscal input by each level of government in rural compulsory education system, the input by the state government only accounted for 1.5% − 2%; the provincial government fiscal input accounted for about 11%; xiang government input accounted for around 85%. 9
The major source of funding used by xiang government in school finance was fees collected from peasants in the name of "education fee" and "education fee plus". generally paid according to a standardized grid that translates variables such as experience, education, performance and rank into pay levels. The standard is set by each xiang educational office. 8 The Law designates 9 years of compulsory schooling, that is, it requires parents to have their children finish primary and junior high school education. 9 source 10 The State Council Decree on Rural School Funds Raising enacted in 1985 awarded the xiang (or town) government the authority to collect the two types of fees from local firms and households. Approval being needed from county government, the xiang government set the amount or rate. The education fee plus charged on household is usually set as a proportion (about 1% − 3%) of the xiang pure income per capita in the previous year.
11 School affiliated firms could also generate some revenues to cover certain expenses in some places.
In places short of regular teachers, contract teachers 12 are also hired. The hire decision is usually made by xiang or villages as well as schools. We will reserve the discussion of two types of teachers to next subsection.
The source of fiscal revenue in many xiangs dried up in late 1990s when the state government implemented a taxation reform to lift various taxes and fees including education fees and education fee plus and to limit the tax authority of local officials. remote villages, and the rigid wage structure does not provide enough compensation for tough working conditions. So villages and xiangs short of teachers seek to hire contract teachers among local residents. The expense is shouldered by villages and/or xiangs.
Contract teachers are likely to be villagers who have above-average schooling but fail to be admitted into colleges. So they tend to have lower educational attainment than regular teachers.
Although the pay is only about one quarter of that of regular teachers, being a contract teacher is still a good option to rural residents. Both the absolute income level and returns to education in rural jobs (both on-the-farm and off-farm jobs) are low. 15 Working in urban areas without urban hukou is usually associated with hardships and discrimination. In contrast, contract teachers do not have to endure pains of being away from family. Moreover, in many places there are chances for them to become regular teachers on the condition that they are recommended by schools and pass certain qualification exams.
Regular teachers' and contract teachers' pays differ not only in levels and sources, but also in the structure. The pay of contract teachers is lump-sum. Some may have a small increase with teaching load. It does not vary much by tenure or other qualification.
Regular teachers' salary usually consists of two parts: basic wages and bonuses. The level of basic wages is determined by teachers' professional title (zhi cheng), job tenure and so on, and financed by the local government. Bonuses are awarded by schools or xiang educational offices to those whose students have exceeding performance. The source of bonus is typically from the budget surplus of schools or xiang educational offices. In some places without surplus, xiang educational offices or schools cut a small proportion from every regular teacher' wages and use it to reward those with good performance in the yearend. As most rural schools are plagued by shortage of funding, the size of bonuses is small relative to that of wages. So higher professional titles are most sought after by To begin with, we consider a xiang with two schools, indexed i ∈ {1, 2} and two new teachers, indexed j ∈ {1, 2}. Schools differ in teaching environment. Teachers differ in their ability of benefiting from the teaching environment. As the principal, the xiang educational official deploys new teachers to schools and chooses a contract to motivate the agents -teachers. The teacher supplies an effort e at a cost c(e) = e 2 /2. Effort is unobservable and hence non-contractible. Educational outcome is of two possible levels,
Both the xiang educational official and the teacher are risk neutral. The limitedliability constraint is assumed so that the moral hazard problem has bite. That is, we assume that the teacher have no wealth that can be pledged as performance bond.
16 elaborate on this point.
Thus, the teacher has to be given a minimum consumption level of ω 0, irrespective of performance. We assume that the xiang educational official has sufficient resources to finance any required salary package and that his reservation utility is zero. We also assume that the principal must make a non-negative payoff.
The types of schools and teachers are perfectly observable to the xiang educational official. He assigns teachers to schools. School i matched with teacher j receives a payoff π ij > 0 if educational outcome is high (Y H = 1) and 0 otherwise. Teacher j matched with school i receives an efficiency gain of θ ij > 0. The probability of high educational outcome is equal to the effort supplied by teacher j in school i plus her efficiency gain
We denote the assignment decision as F. There are two assignment schemes, indexed by F 1 and F 2 respectively. Assignment F 1 matches a school with the same type of teacher, i.e.
Assumption 1. π 11 π 22 and θ 11 θ 22 and π 12 = π 21 = π.
Contracts between principals and agents have two components: a fixed wage ω, which is paid regardless of the educational outcome, and a bonus b, which the agent receives if the outcome is Y H . The contract that picked by the principal applies to both schools.
The principal cannot design one contract for each school. This is a realistic assumption. 17
The xiang educational official's optimal contracting problem with decentralized de-
subject to the following constraints.
1. Limited liability constraint (LL) , requiring that the agent be left with at least ω:
2. Participation constraint (PC) of the agent:
whereū j is the reservation utility of teacher j.
3. Incentive-compatiility constraint (IC), which stipulates that the effort level maximizes the agent's private payoff given (b, w):
We restrict attention to the range of reservation payoffs for the teacher in which the xiang educational official earns non-negative payoffs. The IC constraint can be simplified to
The xiang educational official's problem can be broken into two steps. First, at any given assignment, we can solve for the optimal contract. Second, the assignment F * that yields the greatest utility of the principal is chosen.
We first look for the optimal contract under given teacher assignment. Without loss of generality, we work with the case where ω = 0. The following argument characterizes the optimal contract under different assignment schemes.
Proposition 1. Suppose that π ij + θ ij < 1. An optimal contract (b * s , ω * s ) under assignment scheme s given a reservation payoffū j ∈ [0, (π ij + θ ij ) 2 /2], exists and has the following features.
1. The fixed wage is set at the subsistence level: ω * s = 0, s ∈ {1, 2}.
2. The bonus payment under assignment F 1 is characterized by
The bonus payment under assignment F 2 is characterized by
where Y 2 = max{0, (π 12 + π 21 − θ 12 − θ 21 )/4}.
3.
The optimal effort level is given by e * s = b * s . The expected educational outcome is e * s + θ ij for teacher j in school i.
For the sake of illustration, we focus on the case where π ij > θ ij and the PC is not binding. We also simplify the calculation by taking the following assumption.
Assumption 2: θ 11 = θ 21 > θ 12 = θ 22 , π 11 − π 12 = π 21 − π 22 .
If π 11 − π 12 > π 21 − π 22 , the optimal assignment is F 1 ; 18 the optimal contract is b 1 = (π 11 + π 22 − θ 11 − θ 22 )/4, which is greater than b 2 . If π 11 − π 12 > π 21 − π 22 , the optimal assignment is F 2 ; the optimal contract is b 2 = (π 12 + π 21 − θ 12 − θ 21 )/4, which is greater than b 1 . Recall that π ij − θ ij measure school i's benefit relative to teacher j's gain from assigning teacher j to school i if educational outcome is high. Therefore, the above result implies that, the optimal assignment for the xiang government is the one that yields the maximum net gains. Under this assignment, the xiang government is also able to use relatively high-powered incentives to motivate teachers.
The essence of this simple framework is that the choice of contract hinges on the assignment of teachers. Under centralized deployment, the xiang educational official is able to chooses the combination of assignment and contract that yields maximum gain. Now consider the case where the county government takes over deployment authority. The xiang educational official takes the deployment decision as given and picks the optimal contract. If the assignment scheme chosen by the county government deviates from the above F * , the optimal contract picked by the xiang educational official is likely to deviate from b * . We denote the assignment scheme and contract chosen under centralized
Let's consider two possible cases where the shift of deployment authority may affect teacher incentive. The first case is that the county government has different objectives from the xiang educational official. Whether being more or less equity-oriented, the county government may prefer the assignment scheme that is different from the optimal one under decentralized deployment. For example, suppose the assortative matching F 1 18 It is similar to the condition for assortative matching.
is the optimal assignment for the xiang educational official. Yet the county government cares more about the equitable allocation of teachers across school. So scheme F 2 is adopted. Given this assignment, the optimal contract for the xiang educational official is b 2 , which is smaller than b 1 . The effort induced by this contract and the overall educational outcome is also lower than that under decentralized deployment. Under assumption A more interesting scenario is documented in field studies (Liu 2007). The xiang educational official found the overall educational outcome is higher when the teaching resource was roughly balanced among schools. However, when the county government assumed the deployment authority, it tipped the balance by assigning good teachers to schools close to the county government. Consequently, the xiang educational official had to flatten the wage contract so as not to hurt the incentives of teachers assigned to remote schools. That is, if π 11 − π 12 < π 21 − π 22 , the xiang educational official obtains the maximal net gains by matching teachers with different types of schools. When assortative matching F 1 is adopted, for the xiang educational official, the marginal benefit of inducing one extra unit of effort is lower, therefore, the optimal bonus b should be lower.
The two examples show how personnel interventions from the upper level government,
well-meant or not, might weaken teacher incentives. The reason is that the intervention from upper level government hinders the xiang educational official from exploiting the gains of matching teachers to schools and limits its power to motivate teachers.
The second case is that the county government has the same interest as the xiang government, i.e. he plans to adopt the assignment scheme that preferred by the xiang educational official. However, the county government is less informative on teachers.
In theory, the county government and the xiang educational official can share all the information. However, it is not feasible in reality because of the large number of teachers in each county. Moreover, it may cause other sorts of incentive problems such as collusion etc. 19 It is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we take it as given and illustrate the impact. For example, in the case where F 1 is the optimal contract, the county government has a probability p to mistake type 1 teacher for type 2 teacher (0 < p < 1). So for xiang 19 reference educational official, the optimization problem becomes
The optimal contract under county deployment is b * c = (1− p)b 1 + pb 2 . Under assumption 1 and 2, b * c < b * = b 1 . This result is quite intuitive. If the uncertainty on deployment decision increases, the xiang educational official tends to pick a relatively low-powered incentive contract so as not to hurt teachers' incentive. Consequently, teachers' effort
We show the interaction between deployment decision and contract choice through the analysis of the above two cases. The centralization of deployment power limits the xiang educational official's choice of optimal contract. It may result in the decline of teacher effort and educational outcome. In the subsequent sections, we will examine empirically the impact of deployment centralization on teachers and students.
Data and Identification
Data
The data used in this paper draws upon two sources. The first is the first two waves of Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF). 20 The first wave was conducted in 42 xiangs in 20 counties in Gansu in 2000. The survey randomly sampled 2,000 students aged from 9 to 12. Detailed information was collected regarding their parents, villages, schools and homeroom teachers. Randomly selected teachers from their schools were also surveyed regarding their workload, work conditions, salaries and so on. The second wave of the survey was conducted in 2004 and the same sample of students was followed. Similar and more detailed survey was also run on schools, villages, parents and teachers. Although the same sample of students were followed, teachers surveyed can be different from those who appeared in the first wave. Thus we construct a panel of student data and take the teacher data as two waves of cross-sectional data in the teacher-level regressions.
The We combine these two sources of data together and divide the 42 xiangs into two groups: those with centralized teacher deployment by 2003 (labeled as the centralization group) and those without (labeled as the comparison group). Table 4 that centralization xiangs tend to be closer to the county government.
Next we look at summary statistics of teachers by group presented in table 5. Column (1) and (2) Summary statistics of students to be added.
Identification
This subsection outlines the identification strategy. To isolate the causal role of the incentive effect of centralizing teachers deployment resulting from the reform, we make use of differences across xiangs induced by the timing of the reform and differences between regular teachers and contract teachers in the influence of the reform.
We first specify the benchmark difference-in-difference (DID) model, in which we compare the change in regular teachers' effort and student educational outcomes from 2000
to 2004 in centralization xiangs to that in comparison xiangs. The specification is as follows.
T eacher ef f ort
where teacher ef f ort isrt is measured with self-reported weekly teaching and grading xiang characteristics Z rt . In addition the teacher effort regression 7 controls for teacher i's characteristics X it including gender, age, teaching experience (years of teaching and years of teaching in this school); the student outcome regression 8 controls for students' characteristics M jt .
In equation (7), we restrict our sample to regular teachers because only they are affected deployment power shift. The DID approach excludes the time-invariant endogenous factors. One concern about this approach, however, is that the error terms might be correlated across time and space. We allow for such correlation by computing our standard errors clustered by first at the xiang level, then at xiang-year level and then again at the school level. The statistical significance of our estimates does not change when assessed using the three alternative ways of clustering standard errors.We only report standard errors adjusted by clustering at the xiang level in next section because it is the most conservative estimate.
One of the major threats to the validity of our identification strategy is that there may be omitted non-common time-varying factors that are correlated with both centralizing teacher deployment and test scores. There are two ways in which this might happen.
The first is the endogeneity of the timing of teacher deployment transfer. This would occur if government's choice of where and when to centralize are based upon teachers effort/educational outcomes or on local shocks correlated with teachers effort/educational outcomes. In other words, the county government could have purposively based its personnel centralization on local-specific time-varing information.
In our case, bias from endogenous timing of personnel centralization is not likely to be an issue. The county-based reform is a national policy that applies to all rural schools.
While financial control was stipulated to be transfered in a limited period, the transfer of personnel control depended on political negotiations between the xiang government and the county government 22 and not on test scores or teachers effort level. The previous subsection also shows that the observed pre-reform teacher and student characteristics are not significantly different between two groups. It provides empirical evidence against the most obvious sources of endogenous timing of deployment power shift: those related to teachers and students. We also have included as many as possible time-varying variables as controls to take care of this issue.
The second way in which omitted time-varying factors could confound the analysis is if there were other local-specific time-varying policies or environmental factors that affect treatment observations differently than control ones. We address this concern by using contract teachers as another control on which to base the conclusions about the impact of regular teachers' deployment centralization. As discussed in section 3.2, changes in deployment power do not apply to contract teachers. They remain hired and deployed by local communities or schools. Therefore, by comparing changes in regular teachers' effort with contract teachers' effort, we could get rid of the confounding effects of other local-specific time-varying factors. The DDD model is specified as follows.
T eacher ef f ort isrt
where F i is an indicator for teacher i being a regular teacher. The regular teacher in-22 reference needed dicator F i is interacted with the time dummy T and centralization indicator D, which provides us with the DDD estimate of the impact of deployment centralization on regular teachers' effort. While the characteristics of contract teachers may systematically differ from that of regular teachers, identification of treatment effect will be robust as long as this difference has a constant trend across treatment and control schools. To address the possibility that it is not, we control for a large set of observable individual characteristics.
Unfortunately, for students outcome regression, we are not able to construct such a DDD model because students are usually taught by a combination of regular teachers and contract teachers. However, comparing changes in students achievement across groups
give us a hint on the overall impact of deployment centralization on school quality. 23
Effect of personnel centralization on teacher hours
The estimates of teacher effort regression is displayed in table 6. Column (1) and (2) present results of DID model specified in equation (7), separately estimated for regular teachers and contract teachers. Column (3) and (4) result indicates the negative effect of deployment centralization on regular teachers' effort.
To know whether it is likely caused by xiang-specific time-varing shocks, we need to look at whether contract teacher who are not affected by this centralization exhibits the same pattern. As shown in column (2) The key variable of interest is the third-degree interaction of the centralization indicator (T ), time dummy (post) and the indicator for regular teachers (I(regular teacher) ).
The coefficient of this variable measures how the change of the gap in working hours
between regular and contract teachers in centralization xiangs differs from that in comparison xiangs. The estimates for model including county dummies (column (3)) show that, compared to contract teachers, the increase in regular teachers' working hours in centralization xiangs is 4.1 hours lower than that in comparison xiangs. The effect is stronger if no county dummies included.
To summarize, the average weekly working hours of regular teachers seems to have increased from 2000 to 2004. As similar changes can be seen in contract teachers, it is likely to be caused by region-sepecific factors. However, the increase for regular teachers in centralization xiangs is about 50% lower than that in comparison xiangs. Shorter working hours suggests that regular teachers reduce their effort after the deployment was centralized. However, shorter hours may mean that the efficiency of teaching has been improved. To distinguish the two explanations, we need to further look at the measures of education quality such as student test scores. Section 8 will show the results.
Robustness check
A concern is that the secular trend in towns where teacher deployment has been central- 
Students' academic outcomes
This section examines the impact of centralizing teachers deployment on students' academic performance.
As test scores have a strong persistent component, the precision of the estimated treatment effect can be increased substantially by controlling for a child's pre-treatment test score and cognitive score. Since the attrition is low and the treatment is not likely to be based upon students' scores, the point estimates should be similar to the simple differences in the standard DID specification, but the confidence interval around these point estimates should be much tighter. 24 The panel structure of the student data allows us to use an alternative specification which regresses the change in a student's test score 24 reference (post-test score minus pretest score) on the treatment status of the child's xiang (T ), controlling for the pre-test score of child i in xiang r. Since the treatment effect could be heterogenous to students with different pretest score, we also include the interaction between T and the pre-test score. Other control variables include xiang characteristics (distance from county government, distance between two closest schools and dummies for mountainous areas) and parents' years of schooling. The regression specification can be written as follows. Table 7 presents the results, estimated separately for boys and girls. We restrict the sample to children below 12 years old in 2004 because they stayed in the primary schools during the period 2000 -2004 and were affected by the centralization. All standard errors are clustered at the xiang level.
Column (1) and (2) display the results of Chinese language and math standardized test scores respectively for boys. The average improvement of Chinese language test scores in centralization xiangs is similar to that in comparison xiangs on average. However, as suggested by the significantly negative sign of the interaction between the indicator for centralization group (T ) and pre-test scores, boys with higher pre-test scores were hurt by the centralization. The impact of centralization is negative on boys whose pre-Chinese scores are more than 0.12 standard deviation above the average. The improvement for boys with pre-Chinese scores 1 standard deviation above the average is about 0.16 standard deviation lower in centralization xiangs than that in comparison xiangs. The negative effects on boys' math scores are stronger. On average the improvement of math scores in centralization xiangs is 0.3 standard deviation lower than that in comparison xiangs. Boys with higher pre-math scores are probably hurt more, though the difference is not statistically significant.
Column (3) and (4) reports the results of Chinese and math standardized test scores respectively for girls. The effects of centralization on girls' test scores are not statistically significant. Yet the impact is similar to that on boys'. Both suggests that the centralization of deployment affects students' learning negatively.
Why Centralized Deployment Could Be Undermining?
The results in section 6 and 7 show that deployment centralization tends to undermine teachers' incentive and educational outcomes. The analysis in section 3 shows that the channels could be direct and indirect. The direct channel that is often used as argument supporting centralization is that the allocation of teachers is more equitable under centralized deployment; however, it hurts teachers' incentive by assigning qualified teachers to schools with poor conditions. An alternative channel is through the implementation of incentive pay: xiang educational officials' ability to reward teachers based upon their performance was limited because the centralized deployment creates more uncertainty.
The deployment power shift may also lead to the changes in the composition of teachers as teachers of different characteristics may opt out or into the teaching profession.
In our empirical analysis, the selection of teachers is unlikely to play a major role though its role is probably bigger in the long term. As mentioned before, new teachers are mainly hired among graduates of local teachers' schools. Most of them were already enrolled in those schools when the reform began. Upon graduation, they do not have strong incentive to switch to other professions for several reasons: first, teaching is still the most attractive option for rural students; moreover, the teacher job was almost guaranteed at that time while there is huge uncertainty if one gives up the assigned job and looks for other jobs. In the rest of this section, we will look for evidence on the first two channels by examining the allocation of teachers and their wage structure.
Is allocation of teachers more equitable under centralized deployment?
If centralization of personnel deployment helps to achieve equity, we should observe that schools with poor conditions in centralization xiangs have seen more improvement in terms of teachers' quality/quantity than their counterparts in comparison xiangs.
Therefore, we estimate how the changes in various measures of teacher-student ratio across schools with different pre-conditions differ between centralization and comparison xiangs. The regression for estimation is specified as follows.
are pre-and post-reform measures of teacher-student ratio. We are interested in four measures: total-teacher-to-student ratio, regular-teacher-to-student ratio, contract-teacher-to-student ratio, and college-educatedteacher-to-student ratio. T is the treatment dummy, T = 1 if centralization xiangs; = 0 otherwise. X is the matrix of control variables including the number of students and its square, the number of classrooms, distance from the nearest school, distance from county government and county dummies.
In specification (11), we are particularly interested in α 1 and α 3 . α 1 measures how the increase in average teachers input differs between centralization xiangs and comparison xiangs. α 3 captures the effect of deployment centralization on the distribution of teachers across schools within the county. α 3 < 0 means that teacher-student ratios increase more among schools with low pre-reform teacher-student ratios in centralization xiang. That is, teacher input becomes more equitable in centralization xiangs than comparison xiangs.
Vice versa.
Estimates are presented in Table 8 . In terms of total-teacher-to-student ratio (column (1)), the average increase is smaller than centralization xiangs than in comparison xiangs.
Moreover, in centralization xiangs, schools with greater pre-total-teacher-to-student ratio enjoy a greater increase in centralization xiangs than their counterparts in comparison xiangs. Contrary to the argument for equity-oriented centralization, it indicates that the allocation of teachers became less equitable in centralization xiangs.
The estimated result for the regular-teacher-to-student ratio (column (2)) exhibits the same pattern as that for the total-teacher-to-student ratio. Estimates are of the same magnitude. Though statistically insignificant, the effect on college-educated-teacher-tostudent ratio are also consistent with these two measures. In terms of the allocation of contract teachers (column (3)), the pattern is a bit different. Although both the average effect and distributional effect are statistically insignificant, the estimated coefficients show that the number of contract teachers relative to students (column (4)) increased more in centralization xiangs. The increase is smaller in centralization xiangs among schools with greater pre-contract-teacher-to-student ratios. But the magnitude is only 1/3 of the corresponding coefficient in regressions for total-teacher-to-student ratio, regular-teacher-to-student ratio and college-teacher-to-student ratio.
Recall that contract teachers are usually of lower qualification than regular teachers.
The results consistently negate the hypothesis that centralizing deployment facilitates equitable allocation of teachers. On the contrary, there are signs that the allocation of regular teachers and college-educated teachers became even less equitable under centralized deployment. Therefore, the hypothesis that equalizing allocation of teachers hurts teachers' incentive is unfounded.
Centralization and incentive pay
An alternative channel is through the implementation of incentive pay. To examine this channel, we explore into regular teachers' wage structure to see whether the payoff in centralization xiangs become less merit-based. That is, we test that wages become less responsive to teachers quality measures (such as education diploma and working hours) and more responsive to seniority and job tenure in centralization xiangs.
The empirical specification is as follows.
where Q j istr is the j-th characteristics of teacher i in school s in xiang r in time t; X is the matrix of control variables including school characteristics as well as the teacher's own characteristics. We construct four variables that measure different dimensions of teacher characteristics: teachers' education degree, weekly working hours, age and years of teaching.
The variables of interest is T × post × Q j istr . The coefficient of this variable captures how centralization changes the rate of return to certain characteristic of the teacher. If the pay becomes more merit-based in centralization xiangs, we expect that β 4 > 0 for teachers' education degree and weekly working hours; and β 4 < 0 for age and years of teaching. Vice versa. (1) shows that the log wages associated with the educational attainment of the teacher. 25 Compared to the pre-reform rate of return, the wage increment for one level increase in educational degree is 6% lower in centralization xiangs than in comparison xiangs. That is, wages in centralization xiangs became less responsive to teachers' education degree.
The weekly working hours (column (2)) also exhibits a similar pattern though the effect is statistically insignificant and the magnitude is smaller. In contrast, column (3) and (4) show that wages in centralization xiangs became more responsive to the teacher' age and years of teaching. The results suggest that, the payoff becomes less merit-based and more seniority-based in centralization xiangs. Although not proved directly, it is likely that the implementation of performance pay is a channel through which deployment centralization hurts teachers' incentives.
It is worth emphasizing that from the main effects in the four regressions in table 9, we can see that the wage level has generally increased after the reform. Moreover, teachers in centralization xiangs have enjoyed a greater wage increase. The "county-oriented" reform has improved teachers' compensation. However, the flatter wage structure dampens teachers' incentive.
Conclusion
The policy changes examined in this paper is only the beginning of the new wave of fiscal centralization in China. Since then, the national government has been carrying out a series of reforms such as subsidizing rural students from national and provincial government, prohibiting schools from hiring contract teachers etc. All the measures 25 The educational attainment is an ordered categorical variable: it equals 1 if the teacher's highest education degree is primary school; 2 if she gets a junior high school degree; 3 if she gets a senior high school degree; and 4 if he gets college degree or above. For simplicity, we use it as a linear variable here. feature certain degree of fiscal centralization. These reforms aim to increase the input in rural education system. However, the productive efficiency of these reforms is rarely studied. School finance reforms are likely tipping the balance of power in the education system, and hence lead to changes in the allocation of personnel authority and other administrative power. Those changes are unlikely to be neutral. Evidence provided in this paper shows that centralization of teacher deployment could be undermining teachers' incentive and students' academic outcome. A likely channel is through weakening the link between teachers' pay and their performance.
While the evidence on the effectiveness of teachers' performance contract has been growing, little attention has been paid to the incentives of the implementer. The result in this paper points out the importance of the institutional setting to the implementation of incentive contract. Although China is somewhat exceptional compared to the rest of the world where fiscal decentralization has been fashionable, the centralization of teacher deployment is far from rare even in fiscally decentralized countries.
Appendices A Gansu Survey of School Governance
We conducted a retrospective survey, the Gansu Survey of School Governance (GSSG), The questionnaires were designed for principals, teachers, local education officials and villagers (students' parents and randomly chosen villagers in the same community) respectively. Students' parents answered questions regarding communications with teachers, participation in school decision-making, family expenses on education, targeted educational attainment of children and so on. Specially we asked whether and how parents participate in mass movement in the past ten years to voice out concerns in the local education system.
Questions for the first three types of interviewees focus on school governance and policy changes. The interviews were individual-based and confidentiality was promised.
Answers were cross-checked among different types of interviewees. We can extract important information on four groups of key educational decisions and responsibilities. Table   1 presents a summary. 26 The curriculum was set by and textbooks are selected by the national government. The reforms in 2001 does not change this nature. As we mentioned previously, centralization is mainly characterized by the locus of decisions on personnel and budgets. Centralization of personnel decision lagged that of budgets. 26 Indicators used in the OECD countries. 
(3) Other controls include teachers' gender age, age square, years of teaching, years in this school; schools' student-teacher ratio, number of classrooms. Other control variables include the number of students and its square, the number of classrooms, distance from the nearest schools, the distance from county government. Other controls include teachers' gender square, years of teaching, years in this school; schools' student-teacher ratio, number of classrooms.
